| CORPORATE FINANCE |
December/
January 2003 |
ALTERED STATES - DEALS OF 2002
How CFOs are using deals in lean times
to transform their companies, restore them to health and position
them for growth.
By Abe De Ramos, Jasper Moiseiwitsch
and Tom Leander
It may not have been a vintage year in
the usually vibrant world of Asian corporate finance, but
there were still some tasty deals in 2002. And that's quite
an achievement given the crippling financial climate. As the
global economy moved from bad to worse, many companies, naturally
weakened by their own credit standing, were either rendered
vulnerable to competition or simply saw their funding sources
dry up.
With rising premiums to access the capital
markets, many finance chiefs were reduced to merely trying
to minimize losses. But the most astute chief executives and
CFOs in the region refused to let hardships sway their fortunes.
They didn't simply manage risks; they saw opportunities to
transform their businesses.
As such, the best deals of the year are
remarkable, but not for the usual reasons, such as the billions
of dollars raised, or the thousands of people who queued for
hours to subscribe to an IPO. They are outstanding because
they show that corporate finance need not be confined to the
goals of improving working capital or tiding a company over
for a tough financial year. Given the changing demands from
investors in the way companies run their businesses, corporate
finance can take a lead in corporate transformation.
In choosing the winners for our third
annual Deals of the Year, CFO Asia selected transactions that
were significant because they didn't just plug potential holes;
they promised better long-term opportunities to the companies
involved. These deals, directly or indirectly, will also have
a lasting impact on the CFOs' financial management skills
as well as on their companies' corporate governance principles.
PLDT's Acquisition
Defense Strategy
Financial advisor: JP Morgan
Betrayal, law suits, and a billion dollars
are elements of a gripping Hollywood plot. But just when you
thought that America had the monopoly on boardroom dramas,
one of the most acrimonious this year happened on Asian soil.
The case could have been a simple sale of a controlling stake,
but events unravelled with such surprising twists that none
of the players will view acquisitions the same way again.
The protagonist in the drama is PLDT,
the dominant Philippine phone company. In June, Hong Kong-based
First Pacific, owned by the Salim family, announced an agreement
to sell its 24 percent stake in PLDT to John Gokongwei, a
local tycoon who controls the JG Summit conglomerate. Under
the deal, Gokongwei would pay First Pacific US$925 million
for the stake, or a 300 percent premium over PLDT's then value
of 300 pesos a share.
Simple as it seemed, the situation was
unique because PLDT CEO Manuel Pangilinan, a career-oriented
bachelor known for his working weekends, is also the executive
chairman of First Pacific. His ignorance of the deal reveals
the depth of the disagreement marring the decades-long relationship
between him and the Salims.
The jolted Pangilinan and board of directors
of PLDT, a New York-listed company, reacted with a lawsuit,
saying First Pacific violated US securities laws for not disclosing
its memorandum of agreement (MOA) with Gokongwei. When the
MOA was disclosed, the version filed in the US showed that
JG Summit, a PLDT competitor, was party to the agreement.
The version filed in the Philippines, however, only had First
Pacific and Gokongwei as parties.
The discrepancy had serious implications.
The MOA confirmed that Pangilinan was to be replaced, and
Gokongwei, or JG Summit, would appoint directors. Under PLDT
by-laws, no competitor can sit on its board. As such, Pangilinan
refused to open PLDT's books for due diligence until the discrepancy
was clarified. Ultimately, an explanation came, but not until
four weeks before the effectivity of the MOA lapsed. A humbled
Gokongwei eventually backed out.
The peculiarities of the affair overshadowed
a compelling reason why the takeover attempt failed. Unlike
most acquisitions in Asia, this one relied solely on the power
and understanding of the board of directors. The deal was
not a hostile takeover since there was no general offer that
would benefit - or undermine - all shareholders. Instead,
it was a proxy contest, where the benefit of the high premium
Gokongwei was willing to pay would go only to the Salims.
The decision depended on what directors
thought about the value that Gokongwei could bring to PLDT
- and thus its other shareholders - versus what Pangilinan
could over time. "In a traditional hostile [takeover],
it's about the money; in a proxy contest, it's about the new
management team," says Todd Marin, managing director
at JPMorgan, which advised PLDT on its defense strategy. "That's
why you typically see proxy contests launched against targets
that had management teams that have poorly performed. That's
the argument the insurgent makes."
Sentiments swung both ways. Analysts agreed
that ownership by cash-rich JG Summit could improve the credit
rating of PLDT, a frequent borrower. But they also believed
Pangilinan was capable of pulling PLDT out of its debt load.
In the end, directors sided with Pangilinan.
Shares of JG Summit companies performed worse than PLDT's
over time, while the sell-down of PLDT shares after the MOA
announcement showed that shareholders did not welcome Gokongwei.
The board's analysis of other performance metrics of PLDT
and JG Summit, Marin says, also led to the directors' unanimous
backing of Pangilinan.
Pangilinan's victory is only temporary.
First Pacific is still finding ways to sell its stake, which
could affect PLDT's already battered share price. But one
thing is certain: if Pangilinan bungles or succeeds in managing
PLDT, there is no question that the accountability, or the
credit, is largely due to the board of directors. ADR
Hyundai
Merchant Marine's sale of ocean car carrier unit
Financial advisors: Credit Suisse
First Boston, Salomon Smith Barney
Sometimes, you have to be cruel to be
kind - even to yourself. Hyundai Merchant Marine (HMM) of
South Korea took this path in August when it sold its ocean
car carrier unit to a Swiss-Norwegian consortium for US$1.5
billion. The result was practically a new lease on life for
the deeply indebted company. The sale drastically cut its
debt-to-equity ratio from a punitive 13.9 times to a more
manageable three times.
The deal wouldn't have been as rich if
HMM hadn't found the perfect structure to attract the perfect
buyers. Prior to the sale, the division was cash-generative
to HMM, being the exclusive carrier of cars made by Hyundai
Motors and Kia Motors. The division had no substantial hard
assets since almost all of its vessels were leased, so valuation
depended on the future business the division could secure
for itself.
While HMM was looking for buyers, it tried
to convince Hyundai and Kia to retain their relationship with
the unit. When the Wilhelmsen-Willenius consortium emerged
as a potential buyer, Hyundai and Kia were convinced, and
even took a 20 percent stake in the new company to be formed
out of the sale. Wilhelmsen and Willenius each took a 40 percent
stake in the new venture.
The deal would have Hyundai and Kia agreeing
to ship their cars via the new venture for the next seven
years. While this guaranteed the future of the business, the
entry of the foreign partners also diversified revenue sources:
if the Koreans' car supply goes down, the Europeans can bring
in new capacity.
"This became the basis of the valuation
of the business," says Moshin Nathani, managing director
at Salomon Smith Barney. "It illustrates the maturity
of the market that buyers are willing to pay real cash for
future cash flows." That said, managers at CSFB, another
advisor, note that due diligence necessary for the valuation
was not easy: like other Korean conglomerates, HMM had never
produced detailed financial statements for the car carrier
unit.
The deal was valued at US$1.3 billion
in cash and US$200 million in assumed debt. US$300 million
of the cash component came from the equity injections of the
new stakeholders, and US$1 billion in new debt. The lending
banks were largely the same as HMM's creditors.
The deal created the world's largest ocean
car carrier company. For the Scandinavians, they realized
their mutual goal of expanding beyond Europe. For HMM, its
remaining restructuring plans now seem to be simple tasks.
ADR
Kirin Brewery's
acquisition of a 15 percent stake in San Miguel Corp
Financial advisors: Deutsche
Bank, Goldman Sachs
Call it a friendly brew. When Japanese
beer maker Kirin took a 15 percent stake in the Philippines'
San Miguel last December, they both embraced a partner with
a shared ambition - regional growth. And beyond the warm glow
of cross-border synergies, the deal had an impact on the fancy
interplay between politics, state affairs, corporate finance,
and corporate governance.
San Miguel, a food and beverage group,
is not easy to own because of its complicated share structure.
The Philippine government claims ownership of 47 percent of
its shares, but 20 percent of this is also claimed by Eduardo
Cojuangco, crony of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos. A
legal tussle froze the number of San Miguel shares, and foreign
ownership was possible only through a small public float.
San Miguel's fortunes changed in 1998,
when a partial legal victory gave Cojuangco control over the
majority of the board seats. These included five directors,
thought to side with Cojuangco, since they were appointed
by former President Joseph Estrada, a political ally. The
victory would allow San Miguel to issue new shares other than
for stock dividends, which it did to accommodate Kirin.
Worried about share dilution, the Philippines,
now under President Gloria Arroyo, knew it could play hardball
in court. But the US$536 million that Kirin brought in was
too large to ignore. Since the Asian crisis, Manila had suffered
an exodus of foreign investments. So the Arroyo government
proposed a pact: it would replace the five Estrada appointees
with its own, and in return, wouldn't question Cojuangco's
ownership of San Miguel for two years. It may be an open-ended
solution, but all parties called it a winning deal.
For Kirin, its toehold in San Miguel through
the purchase of new, as opposed to existing, shares is indisputable.
"Kirin acquired new shares so no legal issues associated
with those shares would arise," says Charles Martin,
managing director for Deutsche Bank, which advised the Japanese
brewer. "No one can come to Kirin after six months and
say, 'Those are our shares.'" Kirin got two seats on
the board, and with Manila's five, corporate governance at
San Miguel should improve because of better checks and balances.
Shareholders unanimously approved of the
Kirin buy-in, which came at a 25 percent premium over San
Miguel shares at the time. The cash infusion gave San Miguel
greater firepower to expand. It already has breweries overseas,
but Kirin's implied financial backing gave it greater leverage
in going regional. This is good for Kirin, which faces pricing
pressures in Japan and sees the region as a growth area. ADR
Sunway City's
property-backed securitization
Financial advisor: Deutsche
Bank
In a region where the largest conglomerates
are likely to be involved in real estate, it's a wonder why
Asia ex Japan, hasn't yet developed a property-backed securitization
market. But that may change as the market for new property
remains weak while developers' debts remain a burden. Last
October, a Malaysian company worked with the local regulators
in issuing the first property-backed securitization in the
country.
It wasn't an ordinary deal. Most asset-backed
securities (ABS) in the developed markets - US, Europe, Japan
and Australia - are commercial mortgage-backed securities.
As such, most ABS issuers are financial institutions that
own the mortgages. In Malaysia, the secondary market for mortgages
has already been appropriated by the state-owned Cagamas,
which buys mortgages from financial institutions. The kind
of securitization deals most likely to emerge in Malaysia,
therefore, are credit-tenant lease type transactions, in which
the issuers are the property companies themselves.
Sunway City, which builds resorts, opened
the market when it securitized six of its subsidiaries' property
holdings. Sunway's huge debt level limited its ability to
further raise capital to fund current projects. The deal,
which raised 450 million ringgit (US$118 million), reduced
its debt-to-equity ratio from 1.4 times to 0.7 times, and
allowed CFO Yau Kok Seng to focus on Sunway's future business,
instead of managing its high leverage.
Under the deal, Sunway sold at fair value
six property holdings and some preferred shares to a special
purpose vehicle, ABS Real Estate (AREB). To pay for them,
AREB issued bonds, and then leased the property back to Sunway.
As such, AREB had a steady cash flow from the leases, from
which it would pay the interest and principal of the bonds.
Sunway, on the other hand, was able to reduce its debt without
losing control of its property. In fact, Sunway has the option
of buying the property back from AREB after five years.
Because Malaysia had no rules for such
transactions - such as those governing SPVs and their tax
implications - Sunway had to work with the local SEC to make
the deal possible. "This deal has been very insightful
for both investors and regulators," says Roger Ng, head
of liability risk management at Deutsche Bank in Kuala Lumpur.
ADR
Resolution
of Woori Financial's 10 trillion won non-performing loans
Arranger: Lehman Brothers
Hand it to Euoo-Sung Min for having his
cake and eating it too. When the CFO of Woori Financial Group
wanted to get rid of 10 trillion won (US$8.4 billion) worth
of non-performing loans (NPLs) in the companies under his
wing, he found not just a willing buyer of all the bad assets,
but also a foreign partner to help expand Woori's services.
While Min wanted to clean up Woori's balance
sheet, he also knew that a number of its NPLs had a fair chance
of turning around. In fact, as the Korean economy recovered
from the Asian crisis, NPL buyers, mostly foreign distressed
fund managers, made as much as 35 percent returns from recovered
NPLs.
Min, a former investment banker, knew
this was to his advantage. In selling the NPLs, he set out
two conditions: that the buyer purchase the assets through
a joint venture (JV) company with Woori, and that it also
buy US$180 million in bonds convertible to Woori shares. Two
foreign buyers were short-listed, and US investment bank Lehman
Brothers won over GE Capital.
The JV structure, which shares the benefits
of the recovered loans with the same company that sold them,
is a first in Korea. Prior NPL deals were straightforward
sales. To make sure that the loans Woori sells to the JV are
not re-consolidated in its balance sheet, Woori took only
a 30 percent stake in the partnership. Under the deal, however,
Lehman and Woori will have an equal split of the profits from
the recovered loans.
The benefits to Woori don't end there.
The convertible bonds it sold to Lehman are equivalent to
a 5 percent stake in Woori, making Lehman a strategic partner.
"Min wanted a partner that could help Woori come up with
a non-asset revenue generating business, rather than just
lending with a larger balance sheet," says Jae-Woo Lee,
Lehman's country head in Korea. "They wanted to be in
the derivatives business, and a partner who can teach them
and transfer knowledge in this area."
And what does Lehman get from the deal?
A lot, says Lee, who believes Lehman can still make 15 to
25 percent returns from its NPL purchases. With its stake
in Woori, Lehman could benefit from the strengths of the group,
particularly Woori Bank, Korea's second largest bank. "Woori
has a large client base and a big balance sheet, but we have
the expertise and technology, so we'll create synergies,"
says Lee.
The success of the deal also adds to Lehman's
credentials as it eyes NPL deals in Taiwan and China. "Due
to [the deal's] wide applicability, Lehman is now in advanced
discussions with other banks in North Asia about applying
similar models," Lee adds. ADR
LG Electronics
demerger
Financial advisor: Salomon Smith
Barney
A "demerger" is an M&A term
that sounds more like a step backwards than forwards. But
South Korea's LG Electronics (LGE) proved it ain't necessarily
so. Its April split-up improved corporate governance and boosted
the share prices of the new entities.
In the transaction, LGE spun off its core
electronics divisions - about 90 percent of the assets - into
a new listed entity, also called LG Electronics. The other
investments, principally mobile services provider LG Telecom
and fixed-line operator Dacom, were demerged into another
entity called LG Electronics Investments (LGEI). Those that
had invested in the old LGE were given proportional shares
in the new companies.
The deal untangled cross-shareholdings,
improved transparency and clarified the investment stories
of the new companies. For example, fund managers who may have
liked the old LGE's successes in consumer electronics, but
were turned off by LG Telecom's 3G plans, can now choose to
isolate their cash in the new LGE alone.
When investors didn't understand how their
money was passed between affiliates, "it was very difficult
to value the company properly," says Shaheryar Chishty,
vice president at Salomon Smith Barney. "And in the absence
of clarity, investors just tended to discount." The demerger
gave that clarity, and the effect was immediately visible
in the higher market cap of the new companies.
In truth, LG Electronics was glad to be
rid of its telecom units as these had dragged on its earnings.
"We've invested more than one trillion won [US$780 million]
in LGT since 1999 and we haven't been happy about it,"
confessed LGE's CFO Young-soo Kwon around the time of the
demerger.
As expected, LGEI hasn't done so well
out of the restructuring. Its share price is down about 65
percent from mid-October 2001, when rumors of the demerger
surfaced. Nevertheless, the new companies can now focus on
their own enterprises, and investors have a clearer idea of
the risks and returns they can get from either entity. Considering
the impenetrable inter-group transactions of Korea's chaebol
days of yore, the demerger is a giant leap towards accountability.
"This (restructuring) isn't something
LG had to do; there was no regulatory driver behind it,"
says Jongho Park, LGE's VP Finance. "The company is just
trying to address the needs of international capital markets,
to complement its global marketing strengths with a reputation
for strong corporate governance." As LG Group continues
to restructure, it aims to show that the sum of the parts
can be worth more than the whole. JM
Indofood's issue
of US$280 million five-year notes
Financial Advisor: Credit Suisse
First Boston
Flashback to 1997. Indofood, one of Indonesia's
most respected companies and the world's biggest maker of
instant noodles, watched as its world fell apart. The rupiah
was sinking and it was taking Indofood's US$1.2 debt down
with it. Rioters were looting Chinese-controlled companies.
Indofood was targeted and one of its factories was torched.
Even the home of CEO Eva Riyanti Hutapea was attacked.
It was crisis Indonesian style, and the
timing couldn't have been worse. Early that year, Indofood
bought a refinery, plantation and a distribution business,
funded by poorly-hedged US dollar loans. Indofood found itself
having to finance these with income from a rapidly sinking
rupiah. Bankruptcy loomed.
Flashforward to 2002. Indofood has transformed
itself from bankruptcy candidate to Indonesia's offshore-markets
star, meeting its debt obligations without fail. Since 1999,
Indofood has settled about US$800 million of US-dollar debt
and about US$230 million worth of rupiah debt, thanks to strong
profits and rigorous risk management (more hedging, less expansion).
But doing so was not easy. Last June,
Indofood had a US$200 million debt due, and even a month before,
deputy CEO Cesar dela Cruz was scrambling for options to avert
a liquidity crisis. Local banks had reached their saturation
point with previous Indofood refinancing. At worst, dela Cruz
could sell assets that were doing well, but he knew refinancing
was the most practical way to go.
The result was the largest international bond sale to come
out of Indonesia since 1997, and what a surprise it was. Indofood
issued US$280 million in five-year notes to highly receptive
international investors. About 90 percent of the deal, upsized
from US$200 million, was placed offshore and priced at the
tighter end of guidance.
The issue ended Indofood's Asian-crisis-induced
debt epic. While it still owed US$569 million as of March
2002, the June deal comfortably extended the maturity profile
of all existing liabilities. It is profitable and its ratio
of EBITDA to consolidated finance charges stands at a manageable
4.2 times.
"They've displayed extreme prudence
in ensuring that their foreign currency exposure is better
hedged," says Carsten Stoehr, head of Asian debt capital
markets for CSFB, sole bookrunner of the deal. "They've
focused on showing that they have the right debt composition
on their balance sheet."
Says Hutapea: "People will look at
us and think we're quite conservative. But I believe Indofood's
strong fundamentals sustained us during the crisis. We were
able to take care of our commitments, and investors know they
can trust us." JM
Bank of China
(Hong Kong) IPO
Financial Advisors: UBS Warburg,
Goldman Sachs
The idea was so far-fetched it could have
come from another galaxy: to float the Hong Kong operations
of state-owned Bank of China. To transform this bureaucratic
giant into something more capitalistic was like taking socialism
out of the People's Republic. But it finally happened in July
this year, after almost three years of painstaking restructuring,
reforms and lobbying. Needless to say, it wasn't easy.
In the run-up to its IPO, Bank of China
(Hong Kong) looked a mess. It had among the lowest net interest
income, the highest non-performing loans (NPLs) and the lowest
returns on equity (ROE) compared to Hong Kong peers. Worse,
the bank played the role of an ATM to "window" companies,
or Chinese government funding vehicles that came to Hong Kong
in their thousands throughout the 1990s. As a fellow Chinese
enterprise, the bank felt obliged to lend to these windows.
"We had a close relationship with
the China-related enterprises, window companies in Hong Kong
in particular," says Norman Law, CFO of Bank of China
(HK). When the Asian crisis took down Hong Kong's property
market - the preferred investment of window companies - its
NPLs naturally swelled. "Our high NPL legacy is very
much related to the Asian financial crisis, and also to this
high exposure to China-related entities," Law adds.
The state-oriented credit policy was matched
by a socialistic work culture. Nicole Yuen, head of Asian
equity corporate finance for UBS Warburg, a joint global coordinator
on the deal, describes the bank's pre-IPO culture as one of
"everyone eats from the same rice bowl" - a jobs-for-life,
company-as-parent culture that inspired tremendous loyalty
but little accountability.
"If you read some of the literature
that the senior management of Bank of China wrote, it's very
moving," says Yuen. "They said, 'We have to move
with time, we have to move with the market.'" That may
sound like empty rhetoric from any company elsewhere in Asia,
but in patriarchal China, it's hardly ever heard. "It's
like a father speaking to his son: please help us improve
because we are not in good shape," adds Yuen.
Law says this shift in corporate culture
was the most difficult part of the restructuring - more difficult
than merging 12 affiliate institutions, which required a special
legislative bill, or integrating the accounts and IT platforms
of the affiliates, or dealing with problem loans. Now, Law
says the bank has shifted its focus from market share to ROE,
stressing innovation and responsibility over obedience and
rote compliance.
These efforts were rewarded. The bank's
US$2.5 billion Hong Kong listing marked the largest non-US
IPO in 2002. Despite troubled markets, the deal priced at
the top of the indicative range on strong demand.
In its interim report post-listing,
the bank has reported sharp improvements in all the key numbers:
net interest margin, ROE and NPL ratios. But, oddly for a
bank merger and restructuring of this size, it has managed
all this with minimal layoffs. Does that mean that some of
the old thinking still survives? JM
Nissan's joint
venture with Dongfeng Motors
Financial advisor: Goldman Sachs
Nissan's deal to take a 50 percent stake
in a new JV company with China's third largest automaker adds
Asia's sweetest turnaround story to the ongoing saga of the
world's fastest transforming market. The company returned
to profitability last year after a determined struggle to
strip away non-core businesses and improve its finances following
its purchase by French automaker Renault in 2000. The deal
with Dongfeng Motors is Nissan's first bid to restore its
glory in the global market for auto sales.
The road to China is littered with non-profitable
auto joint ventures, and on the surface Nissan's Dongfeng
deal resembles many other star-crossed JVs. General Motors
famously got stuck in a JV with Shanghai Automotive Industry
Corp (SAIC) making vehicles unsuited for the Chinese market.
Citroen, the French automaker owned by Peugot, has been manufacturing
the Fukang sedan with Dongfeng at a loss for nearly 10 years.
The Nissan deal may have skirted some
of the dangers. Traditionally, the Chinese government keeps
tight control on foreign ownership in the auto sector by requiring
time-consuming approvals for each new product. Nissan won
a single approval to market up to seven vehicles in the PRC,
and the right to set up a research and development unit for
new cars - a first.
The US$1.03 billion will be used to free
the JV from the debts Dongfeng incurred under state ownership,
and to install Nissan's production, distribution and purchasing.
The aim is to manufacture 550,000 vehicles a year by 2006,
up from Dongfeng's production of 350,000 vehicles, mostly
trucks and buses, today.
In cutting the deal, Nissan avoided a
perennial trouble-spot. Dongfeng already has other JVs with
Peugeot and Honda. The terms hive off these competitive operations
into a new company, cancelling out Dongfeng's ability to play
one foreign JV partner off against the other. But there may
yet be a downside. Carlos Ghosn, the CEO of Renault, personally
brokered the deal himself, flying to Wuhan where Dongfeng
is based, three times to hammer out the details. He tried,
but failed, to gain a controlling 51 percent in the venture.
Ghosn's reputation as a turnaround tsar
in the auto industry has hinged upon his ability to change
company cultures, slashing costs and installing stringent
measures of performance. Nissan CFO Thierry Moulonguet was
largely responsible for importing the "Ghosn effect"
to Japan. He will now try to make it work for China, without
a full measure of control. TL
Celcom Restructuring
Financial advisor: Citibank
The deal to recapitalize Celcom, Malaysia's
second largest mobile phone operator, was an ingenious drama
of risk and reward played out in the local capital markets.
Dramatis personae included Malaysian prime minister Mahathir
Mohamad, ousted finance minister Anwar Ibrahim, and a swashbuckling
Malaysian tycoon named Tajudin Ramli. It had a deus ex machina,
too - ringgit debt and equity investors, who grasped the viability
of the plot, and which way the wind was blowing.
The deal was prompted by the Malaysian
government, which owned a majority stake in TRI, the conglomerate
that owned 100 percent of Celcom, the nation's second largest
mobile phone company. The government came by its ownership
of TRI in 1999 through a controversial swap of shares for
cash with TRI's former chief executive Ramli. At that time,
TRI was heavily in debt, and Ramli used the cash from the
swap to pay off the debts. That Ramli, the owner, was a friend
of Anwar, now ousted as finance minister and jailed, prompted
charges of cronyism. Despite losing ownership in TRI, Ramli
retained an 18 percent stake in Celcom. Even after Ramli's
paydowns, TRI was unable to lift itself out of the red. Early
last year, TRI defaulted on some US$375 million in euro-convertible
bonds. The danger that debt holders would seize control of
Celcom, the most viable unit belonging to TRI, was very real.
So the burning question became: how to
save Celcom from being seized? The only way to do it, bankers
reckoned, was to craft an offering that would be equally attractive
to both bond and equity investors - it would remove a measure
of risk and replace it with the possibility of reward. If
bond investors in Celcom could be coaxed into helping pay
off TRI's obligations, the thinking went, then perhaps equity
investors in TRI could be encouraged to inject new equity
into the sick parent, ensuring that it would no longer threaten
Celcom's survival.
The deal was in fact a complex trade-off
of risks, and to succeed, had to be aggressively marketed
- and clearly explained - to local investors. Despite the
complexity, it went off without a hitch. Citibank arranged
the debt offering in the local bond markets, issuing US$289
million in local currency medium-term bonds, US$26 million
of commercial paper, and US$171 million of local currency
bank debt. From these proceeds, US$375 million went to TRI
to clear up its euro-convertible outstandings. Simultaneously,
equity investors in TRI were issued a rights offering and
restricted stock worth US$421 million - bolstered by the confidence
that the bond offering had helped ensure its survival.
TL
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