| CORPORATE FINANCE |
June 2002 |
THE 0.1 PERCENT SOLUTION
When is an acquisition not an acquisition?
When the acquired company thinks it's a merger...
By Carla Rapoport
On April 1 this year, anyone with a bank
account with Japan's Mizuho Bank was in big trouble. The new
bank, created through the merger of Industrial Bank of Japan,
Fuji Bank and Dai-Ichi Kangyo, was spitting out ATM cards,
refusing to pay out cash to its own customers and causing
general chaos up and down the country.
The problems got sorted out, but anger
raged for a lot longer. It turns out that when the three banks
tried to integrate their operations, they simply couldn't
agree on whose computer systems would survive the merger.
Instead, in Japanese fashion, they knocked out a compromise,
involving a relay system to bridge the Dai-Ichi Kangyo and
Fuji systems. The deal saved face, but it ended up destroying
the bank's important first week in business. And the moral
of the story? In a 1:1:1 merger, no one can effectively take
charge.
Not far from a major Mizuho branch in
Tokyo's central Ginza district, the CFO of Chugai Pharmaceutical,
one of Japan's leading drug companies, watched the Mizuho
drama closely. In the middle of a merger himself, Yuji Suzawa
had good reason to take note of the chaos. Last December,
US$1.7 billion-a-year Chugai announced its intention to tie-up
with Roche, the Swiss drug giant, and its Japanese arm, Nippon
Roche. This month, Suzawa takes the deal to his shareholders.
Still, despite the Mizuho debacle, the 65-year-old exudes
confidence. In the Japanese context, he's a brave man.
Acquisitions, mergers, takeovers - they're
all an anathema to the change-phobic Japanese. But with tougher
competition globally and dull economic performance dragging
into a second decade, Japanese companies are starting to accept
that having a new owner or co-owner is better than going it
alone. M&A is rising (see "Shock Value," May 2002). For companies
with cash, this change of heart offers a real chance to gain
a foothold in the notoriously slippery Japanese market. Groups
such as GE Capital and Ripplewood Holdings of the US have
been showing the way with a string of recent Japanese acquisitions
in the financial services arena and property sector.
A Swiss Roll
From the Japanese perspective, however,
face-saving mergers remain preferable. But, as the Mizuho
story shows that mergers can create new problems, namely raising
the question of who's in charge. Roche's acquisition, valued
at between 155 billion and 198 billion yen (US$1.6 billion),
shows how a competitor can widen its access to the Japanese
market if the predator is prepared to tread very, very carefully
and be generous with autonomy. For one thing, Suzawa and the
rest of his team consistently refer to the deal as a merger.
In fact, US$18.5 billion-a-year Roche will end up with a controlling
50.1 percent of Chugai, assuming shareholders endorse the
deal. But Suzawa and the rest of his team don't believe the
extra 0.1 percent is anything more than a number.
"We're merging with Roche Japan only,"
he says, referring to Roche's own substantial Japanese business.
And he points out, there won't be any Mizuho-type dramas with
that part of the plan. "The name and management of Roche Japan
go to us," he explains, meaning that Roche employees in Japan
will work for Chugai. "We negotiated with Roche in Basel but
we are merging with Roche Japan," he says.
A different approach from Roche, he claims,
would never have been successful with the Chugai board. "If
the [offer had come] from a US company, it wouldn't have been
so easy. The US company would have wanted more than 50 percent
and a blank check on management," he says. Pharmaceutical
industry expert Hidemaru Yamaguchi at Nikko Salomon Smith
Barney agrees. "The deal is one of the rare cases where the
acquired party was allowed to retain management autonomy by
the buyer. Most Western companies would want full control,"
says Yamaguchi. In this case, Roche is proposing to simply
put the head of Nippon Roche on Chugai's board and add three
Swiss non-executive directors.
Daring Dilutions
No wonder Suzawa's delighted these days.
The deal gives the Japanese company real clout in overseas
markets through the Roche sales network as well as strong
synergies at home, allowing for cost-cutting and better profitability.
There's just one small problem. To an outsider, especially
one unfamiliar with M&A, the deal looks like more effort went
into preserving Chugai's autonomy than getting the best terms
for its shareholders.
The deal's structure is part of the problem.
Roche's business conflicts with Chugai's California-based
biotech subsidiary, Gen-Probe. So, as the first step toward
the Swiss acquisition of Chugai, the Japanese company is seeking
a US listing for Gen-Probe, with the intention of distributing
the new shares to Chugai shareholders. Next, Roche will make
a tender offer for 10 percent of Chugai's shares at 2,136
yen (US$17), a hefty premium over the price at the end of
May. Then Roche will buy another raft of shares - dubbed a
third party allotment - at a lower premium of 1,780 yen (US$14)
per share. The size of the second part of the deal will depend
on how many of Chugai's shareholders take up Roche's tender
offer. At the end of the day, this structure ensures that
the Swiss giant will end up with a majority but only by a
face-saving 0.1 percent.
Still, the company's extensive PowerPoint
presentations, posted on its website, do not highlight one
major fact. The deal represents an 80 percent dilution for
Chugai shareholders. Suzawa is not shy about admitting this.
But after four months of working together with the Roche team,
he firmly believes that the cost savings created by the merger
will mean that the effect of the dilution, on an operating
profit per share basis, will be eliminated within a year.
Of course, shareholders in Japan are not
known for their aggressiveness and the two sides have clearly
banked on this cultural fact. However, with the number of
M&A deals growing monthly, murmurs of unrest are starting
to grow. A recent news article in Japan's leading business
daily, the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, reported that pension funds
and other institutional investors are preparing to cast negative
votes on a number of deals, including the Chugai deal, although
no investors were bold enough to be quoted by name. In the
meantime, the best indication of investor sentiment, the company's
share price, is not faring well. In the third week of May,
it was trading at 1,441 yen, compared to 1,725 yen on the
day the deal was announced.
Still, fund managers in Japan know about
as much about M&A and its benefits as they do of yodeling.
Synergy doesn't really translate in Japanese. So, it's now
up to Suzawa and his team to explain that the combined sales
force of Roche and Chugai in Japan alone takes the Japanese
company from 11th in Japan to fourth. And in terms of worldwide
sales, Chugai goes from 45th to being part of one of the world's
ten biggest drug companies. In the drug industry, these are
important numbers.
Even better, after four months of working
together, the "integration team" came up with some big news
last month. Following the merger, Chugai and Nippon Roche
plan to shutter two R&D facilities and reduce their seven
manufacturing plants to four. Sales branches will be cut from
24 to 13 and 95 sales rep offices will drop to 55, with headquarters
at Chugai's Tokyo offices.
The new group will also eliminate 8 percent
of its workforce. In three years, the new company expects
to turn in operating profits of 63 billion yen (US$509 million)
on sales of 315 billion yen (US$2.5 billion). That amounts
to a 50 percent increase in sales and double the operating
profits achieved by Chugai in the year to March.
If Suzawa and his Swiss colleagues
can pull this off, never will 0.1 percent have created so
much value.
Carla Rapoport is managing editor
of CFO Asia based in Hong Kong.
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