| PERFORMANCE MATRIX |
October 2001 |
VALUE VS VOLATILITY
CFO Asia's third annual Performance
100 ranking of Asia's top wealth creating companies reveals
how top companies are gathering strength, even in tough times.
By Tom Leander
Our annual ranking of Asia's best companies
- scored according to their respective economic value added
(EVA) and market value added (MVA) figures - this year earns
a double take. Can that be Chunghwa Telecom coming in at number
9? The Taiwanese company's share price slipped by almost half
in 2001 as it cast about for subscribers to a much delayed
ADR issue. Number 1 China Mobile is looking a little less
lustrous: its share price slumped 28 percent when it released
its interim figures, which showed robust but slowing subscriber
take-up and average revenue per user.
SK Telecom (#7) and Korea Telecom (#11)
are likewise suffering as they prepare their CDMA (code division
multiplication access) mobile services for a public indifferent
to a clunky wireless multimedia offering that lacks content
and software.
Despite the violent lurches in the markets,
the ranking still provides a remarkable report card of value
creation in Asia. The internal elements that have always made
companies climb high on the ranking - such as efficient use
of capital, sound investment strategy, control of costs, and
transparency - continue to work their way into Asia like a
tree through stubborn granite, and the investor retreat from
the boom sectors of tech and telecom has not reversed the
trend.
These are the qualities that create shareholder
wealth as reflected in the Performance 100 (P100), and they
have been popping up in unlikely places. In China, most notably.
This is the first year that the CFO Asia P100 has included
data from all 1,080 listed companies in China. Some 20 of
them have made it onto the ranking, with Baoshan Iron and
Steel (#19) as the front runner. Created as a publicly listed
company in February 2000, Baoshan is 70 percent owned by the
Chinese government.
Despite the lack of shareholder-friendly
ways associated with large, state-owned Chinese companies,
its CFO Jia Xianlin insisted on codifying shareholder-friendly
principles under economic value added, a metric devised by
Stern Stewart, at the company's first meeting as a public
enterprise.
Under Jia's EVA management style, accountability
for management of capital was imposed all the way down to
the steel workers in the boiling foundries. In Jia's view,
this is the prime reason Baoshan has surpassed such admired
companies as Hong Kong's Li & Fung (#22) and Hong Kong-listed
Legend (#25).
How They Pan Out
The P100 list offers three hard-and-fast
tools to pry open a window on an Asian company's ability to
deliver wealth to shareholders. The most important is market
value added.
To arrive at an MVA calculation, US consultancy
Stern Stewart adds up all the capital that investors have
put into a company, including shareholders' equity and debt,
as well as physical assets, and subtracts that figure from
the market value. This straightforward, cash-in versus cash-out
calculation shows whether a company has made or lost money
with the capital investors have devoted to it.
What MVA does so effectively is smash
the illusion of wealth that market cap creates. Compare Via
Technologies, number 38, to Winbond, number 79, two Taiwan-based
chip powerhouses (see CFO Asia, "Going Global,"
July 2000). The collapse in demand for Taiwan's exported chips
and the growth of the chip market in China have affected them
equally. Their market caps are roughly comparable. But Via
has used only US$500 million in invested capital to create
US$2.5 billion in MVA. Winbond has pumped US$2.7 billion in
capital into its businesses, but created only US$1.2 billion
in MVA.
Look to company strategy to understand
why. Both companies operate with a low-cost base. Via's managers
decided to fight tooth and nail against Intel, the US chip
giant, winning a chip-design theft lawsuit that allowed it
into one of Intel's coveted markets, and to invest US$300
million to buy the US chip designer Cyrix. The moves effectively
opened Via to two new markets. They continue to see demand
rise despite declining chip sales.
Winbond has had less luck. It invested
heavily to build a 12-inch-wafer fab based on its calculation
that last year was the trough in the industry's business cycle.
With the economy still languishing, it looks like Winbond
raised capital and invested that money too early to earn its
projected return. Winbond's bets may turn out to be good ones
yet, but investors have fled.
Will they come back? Look to the company's
EVA for the answer. EVA is a measure of internal company value,
providing a definition of true profitability. Like MVA, it
focuses on the use of capital.
To arrive at EVA profits, subtract a charge
for the cost of capital - including equity capital as well
as interest on debt and other charges - from after-tax operating
profits. An EVA number shows how companies perform given the
true costs of their investments quarter-by-quarter and year-by-year.
But the number is not absolute. A company may invest one year,
causing negative EVA in the current period, with the goal
of increasing EVA in the future - a process amply demonstrated
in the case of Winbond.
The chipmaker's heavy expenditures on
R&D and building the new fab are reflected in its US$127 million
of negative EVA. But Winbond's improvement in EVA is US$67
million. If EVA continues to grow consistently, that success
at creating value on the operational level will be reflected
in a higher stock price and a higher MVA. So don't cry for
Winbond yet.
Despite the usefulness of EVA, it cannot
- nor can any metric - predict the future. It is possible,
however, to tweak the numbers on this ranking to find how
much the market expects a company to grow - and whether its
current valuation is reasonable or crazy.
Future growth value (FGV), a metric we
include for the first time this year, quantifies this intangible.
Take a look at SingTel's FGV for an illustration, if SingTel
were able to keep producing last year's net operating after-tax
profits. Add these up, then apply a discount to this number
using its current cost of capital.
The figure you arrive at - US$11 billion
- is the market value SingTel would be able to sustain if
it were able to maintain this level of profits indefinitely.
But the current market value of SingTel is US$18.6 billion,
or US$7.6 billion higher. This figure, its future growth value,
which is best expressed as a percentage of market value, means
that investors expect SingTel to grow 40 percent above its
current valuation.
This may be possible, despite SingTel's
struggles to create value through acquisitions. It's latest
foray, buying Optus, the Australian telecom company, for US$7
billion, initially depressed its stock price, but analysts
now see it as a good deal.
CFO Chua Sock Koong is a staunch defender
of its slow, deliberate hunt for value-creating acquisitions.
"Our position in making investments, whether it is in
Malaysia or Hong Kong," she says, "is that we will
only pay for sensible ones. We have a commitment to deliver
value to shareholders and we didn't want to chase Hongkong
Telecom to unreasonable valuations," she says, referring
to the takeover battle in March 2000 that ended when Pacific
Century CyberWorks nabbed the telecom for US$32 billion.
She adds that this was similar to the
case in Malaysia for TimedotCom, a company that SingTel courted
then backed away from. But even given her staunch stewardship,
40 percent improvement in profits in a saturated and increasingly
competitive market will be hard to achieve. SingTel's next-door
neighbor, Telekom Malaysia (#18), has to face a more rigorous
expectation of growth, with a future growth value some 72
percent of its current market value. Given that the company's
rapid entry into mobile telephony was a major driver of its
share price, this valuation looks increasingly far-fetched.
What Drives Value?
"FGV," says Alan Thompson, head
of Stern Stewart's Singapore office, "shows the height
of the mountain management must scale to preserve the shareholder
value implicit in the share price." He continues: "Management
must take that implicit external contract and turn it into
an internal contract with the company's employees."
That transfer of external expectations
to internal priorities has been happening at last in the region's
most important market. This is the first year that CFO Asia
has included Chinese companies in its ranking of the top value
creators in Asia. China would have been included before, but
it was difficult to get reliable numbers for all of its listed
companies. Oliver Hua, the head of Stern Stewart's Shanghai
bureau, applies a caveat, saying getting reliable numbers
is tough. "We could only work on the information the
companies file, though well aware of how such information
is often erroneous and un-audited," says Hua. He adds
that: "The process seems to be evolving fast," referring
to the greater push for transparency on the part of the China
Securities Regulatory Commission.
It's evolving far from the regulatory
level as well. At Baoshan, CFO Jia describes EVA as "one
of the most scientific ways to measure a company's performance
and it fits our aim to bring value to shareholders, customers
and staff at the same time."
Among the metrics he uses to track this
performance is to glean the amount of extra value workers
can squeeze from raw materials during production. In the finance
department, Jia has shaved basis points off his cost of capital
by entering into factoring agreements with banks rather than
taking out standard loans at prime rate plus. "In China,"
Jia says, "the discount rate for cashing in receivables
is generally lower than the prime rate."
Given that Jia sees factoring -
usually a practice adopted by distressed companies - as a
vehicle for value creation, China clearly has a long way to
go. "We have noticed a marked trend where mainland companies,"
says Hua of Stern Stewart, "while generally performing
well in operational efficiencies - their profit margins, etc.
are comparable to the rest of the world - usually exhibit
terrible capital efficiencies." He adds: "Historically,
a lot of local managers have been proud to show off huge assets
and they still don't have the mindset to concentrate on
reducing the amount of capital needed to generate profits."
In response, Hua is advising China's companies to put
the job of guiding wealth creation where it belongs. "With
the CFO, naturally," he says.
Click
here for Performance 100 chart (pdf document)
Tom Leander is Deputy Editor for CFO Asia.
Additional reporting by Jasper Moisewitsch and Enid Tsui in
Hong Kong. |