| CORPORATE FINANCE |
July/ August
2000 |
ROAD WARRIORS
Going public is a fast-track to fame
and fortune. The recent Nasdaq crash, however, has made the
racecourse that much trickier.
By Steven Crane
With nerves stretched tighter than a widow's
pension check, Deepak Desai grapples with an examiner from
the New York Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) over
a few minor technical issues. It's 5:25pm April 12, the day
before the biggest milestone in CFO Desai's career when his
company, Hong Kong-based Internet content provider Asiacontent.com,
goes public. If the IPO's delayed, Desai knows that months
of intense roadwork will crash in flames. But SEC examiners
aren't known for working late; they finish work at exactly
5:30. His heart starts beating again when the official agrees
to stay an extra ten minutes to resolve the issues. At 5:40,
with matters settled at last, Desai meets his colleagues and
his wife, who's just flown in from Hong Kong, for a celebratory
dinner.
The celebration, however, isn't quite
as joyful as he'd like. Earlier in the day, the normally soft-spoken
Desai was in high-strung discussions with bankers from lead
underwriter Goldman Sachs and the pricing committee of the
company's board of directors back in Hong Kong, about where
to peg the share price. A month before, when Internet stocks
were breaking the sound barrier, a price of US$16 for a market
capitalization of US$549 million would have been a snap, even
though the company was showing a net loss for the first quarter
of US$8.1 million on revenues of US$1.5 million. With Nasdaq's
nosedive the week before, however, these kinds of valuations
were starting to look vulnerable. The decision was made to
price the young company at US$14, valuing it at US$480 million,
a handsome price even by Internet standards. Still, they decided
to scale back the offering from 5.8 million to 5 million shares,
or 14.5 percent of the total. Desai, exhausted and disappointed,
agreed. "Because conditions were delicate," he says,
"we wanted a reasonable chance of holding out in the
market."
For every CFO, going public is proof their
company is a world-class competitor. For starters, a successful
listing can make hard-working managers into millionaires,
even if only on paper. Even better, it puts cash in the corporate
bank account - in Asiacontent's case, US$70 million (minus
US$5 million in fees and expenses) down from the original
target of US$106 million. What's more, the company wins immediate
credibility. Future fund raising, while never a Sunday drive
in the park, gets a lot easier and expanding the business
becomes a workable prosposition. No wonder, then, that in
1999, six of 38 foreign IPOs listed on US exchanges came from
Asia. And until recently, they all did pretty well in the
aftermarket. At one point, Chinadotcom, the Hong Kong-based
Internet portal, rocketed up 1,332 percent from its July 19,
1999 offering price of US$10 a share to US$143 a share. While
not quite as impressive, Korea Telecom, a US$8.5 billion-a-year
telecoms company, saw early gains of about 107 percent. By
April this year, 15 more Asian IPOs listed on American exchanges
with a dollar volume of US$3.54 billion. The big winner was
China's Internet portal Sina.com, which as of May 11 was up
67 percent from it debut on April 13.
These successes aside, the Nasdaq crash
has had chilling effect on the business of IPOs both in the
US and Asia. While the local IPO markets have remained active,
valuations are down and aftermarket trading is generally at
issue price or lower. Hong Kong's Growth Enterprise Market
(GEM), set up with easier listing requirements than Hong Kong's
main exchange, has seen four IPOs shelved between April and
June. Since its launch last November, GEM's index has plunged
by 47 percent. Investors, says Hong Kong-based Rajeev Gupta,
securities analyst for Goldman Sachs' Asia investment research
division, are now wary of companies that don't focus on cost
of revenue and cost of operations. "In this market, only
the top companies in their field will be successful,"
says Gupta, "or those with a good track record of three
to five years."
In Singapore, the market is considerably
more lively, mainly because companies that do list have to
meet higher requirements and more conservative investors demand
solid prospects. From January 1, 32 companies had listed by
June 1, compared with 50 for all of 1999. Only two companies
postponed their listing. One of those, Internet search engine
Catcha.com cited "weak market sentiment" for its
delay and said it would push ahead only when stability returns.
By then, it may be too late. Catcha's balance sheet shows
about S$3.5 million (US$2 million) in cash with first quarter
revenue of US$145,000. Profits aren't expected until 2002.
But with capital expenditure of US$1.7 million in the first
quarter, that delay might mean leaving the race permanently.
Maximum Overdrive
Given Nasdaq's weakened state, it's not
surprising that Asiacontent's shares have flagged. On the
first day of trading, Desai watched the share price rise to
a high of US$15.98 and then plummet to close at US$11. By
June 19, the stock was trading at US$4.12. "Sure the
price is a bit disappointing," admits Desai, using remarkable
restraint considering he and ten other executive officers
and directors currently hold about 8 million shares or 23
percent of the company. "But we felt we had done our
best. We're in good shape now; if we'd postponed we'd have
lost momentum, the bankers would have lost interest and the
window would have shut. Now we've got the money in the bank
and can go ahead and execute our business."
Indeed, the CFO is a lucky man. The advantage
of being a listed company over its unlisted competitors is
readily apparent. Already, the company has used its funds
to purchase a stake in Cityline, Hong Kong's movie and event
ticketing service, adding to its stable of entertainment brands
such as MTV Asia, SportsLine, CNET and Fashion TV Paris. In
addition, it's launched three sites in China and boosted its
e-commerce business with an investment in on-line retailer
Net Megastore. The business is growing but it won't be profitable
for a while yet. First quarter results show a net loss of
US$8.1 million compared to a US$5.9 million loss in the fourth
quarter of 1999. Revenues are up, though, from US$700,000
to $1.5 million over the same period. And with the company's
newfound status, should it need to top-up its cash reserves
to make up for the roughly US$40 million shortfall due to
the scale back of the offering, Desai says getting more venture
capital won't be a problem. That's because, despite the company's
weak share price, its key backers such as GE Capital and H&Q
Asia Ventures, are in for the long run.
Asiacontent's success, however, was not
just a matter of luck. Despite the trials of a volatile market,
roadshow burnout, bad food and frequently hostile investors,
Asiacontent's managers knew that time was against them. When
the 41-year-old India-born Desai joined Asiacontent in June
last year, after 12 years working for Time Warner in Asia
and the US, the plan was to go public in 12-18 months. At
that time, the company had just acquired on-line publisher
Tricast and US$20 million from investors in a private placement
to establish a content, advertising service and e-commerce
business targeting the Asia market. "We began,"
says Desai with the obvious pride of a seasoned CFO, "as
a frugal company with an experienced staff - we're not 20
year olds."
Defensive Driving
The success of Chinadotcom's listing last
summer and the pressure to get more funding suddenly put the
IPO wheels in motion. Throughout July and August, Desai, along
with former general manager of the South China Morning Post's
Internet businesses and Asiacontent CEO Chris Justice, went
through the Ôbake-off' - selecting the team of investment
bankers, accountants and legal advisors. The basic criteria,
says Desai, was the geographical reach, in terms of local
and US strength; the depth of commitment and resources they'd
devote to our company; and their experience in bringing successful
deals to Nasdaq. "While initially we had doubts about
Goldman's commitment," says Desai, "in the end we
chose them as lead underwriter, along with Lehman Brothers
and WR Hambrecht. The selection process wasn't a beauty contest
but was based on the depth of their belief in us and ours
in them."
By October, the team tackled that trickiest
task of all - drafting the prospectus. "Imagine,"
says Desai, "ten people sitting in a room trying to write
one document - in many ways it's a nightmare." For one
thing, each party at the table has a different agenda. For
the bankers it's short term - doing the deal, marketing it
and hitting the hot button with the investors that are available
at the time. For the lawyers and accountants, it's defining
the framework in narrow, technical terms so that no expectations
are created for potential investors that, if not met, could
lead to future lawsuits. For company executives, it's a long-term
roadmap - the prospectus is the one document that defines
the future of the business. And all this had to be done with
no real corporate track record to highlight - in the traditional
terms of sales and profits, anyway.
From a business perspective, Desai says
meeting Nasdaq's disclosure requirements is like baring your
soul - you have to go through every piece of paper the company's
ever signed related to its history, the founder's actions
and related party transactions. There are absolutely no secrets,
he points out, except for certain commercial transactions,
such as licensing agreements with joint venture partners (eight
in Asiacontent's case) and privacy regulations which varied
considerably among the countries (again eight) of operation.
"It was a constant fight to decide between what we had
to disclose to investors versus the commercial risk in disclosing
too much to our competitors," explains Desai.
Writing the financial section was no easier.
Especially as the SEC, together with major accounting firms
and the Emerging Issues Task Force, set up by the US Financial
Accounting Standards Board to examine methods of financial
reporting, were in discussions on how Internet companies report
revenue. While still thrashing out the prospectus, for example,
the SEC decided that if there's a payment risk between buyer
and seller, a transaction must be recognized by the former
at net value, not full value. "That decision affected
our revenue numbers, of course," says Desai, "but
it made the filing process easier." By early March, after
writing and rewriting the prospectus, then filing and waiting
and fine-tuning some more, the preliminary prospectus went
to the printer. By then, it was time to shape up for the road.
No U-Turns
Because a roadshow is basically no different
than selling soap, the company's road team - Desai, Justice
and Chairman of the Board Clive Ng - needed some coaching
from professional soap-sellers. While Desai is personable,
even charming when discussing his business one-on-one, it
was evident to his media consultant that his act needed some
polishing. He got advice on how to be assertive, how to get
his message across, and, above all, how to stay cool and civilized
when someone in the crowd asks a prickly question. He was
also told to purchase some long socks, as they wouldn't expose
his naked calves to photographers when he was sitting down.
With that advice in mind, it was time to hit the road.
The roadshow took just 12 days, cramming
in meetings dates in Hong Kong, Singapore, Munich, Hamburg,
Frankfurt, Milan, Edinburgh, London, Los Angeles, San Francisco,
Denver, Boston and New York. "We did 80 presentations
in all," says Desai, and each one had to be presented
just like actors on a stage - with the same enthusiasm as
if it were the first night. "Quite honestly," he
says, "there was more hostility on the roadshow then
we expected, mostly because of the Nasdaq crash." In
Edinburgh, for example, in a room including some tough Scottish
fund managers, Desai faced one sceptic who demanded to know:
"Why list? Why not postpone?" Desai's reply: "The
timing is based on our needs." In other words, we need
the money now.
On the eve of Asiacontent's first trading
day in New York, the team felt an overwhelming sense of relief.
No matter that the final price was pegged at the low end or
that the proceeds would be about US$40 million less (after
deductions) than the original target. The IPO was fully subscribed.
At breakfast on the morning of the first day of trading, the
team gathers for a feast of doughnuts and Starbucks coffee,
a favorite of CEO Justice. Later they head for Goldman's offices
to cheer on the trading. Cameras flash and spirits are high
as the price hits a high of $15.98 before starting to slide.
Later, they take a taxi down to Times Square where an electronic
sign is lit up with the message: "Nasdaq Welcomes Asiacontent.com."
Back in Hong Kong, reality sets in. Desai
realizes that going public is just the beginning and with
the company in the limelight it's time to start delivering.
With one eye on the drooping share price, he's back to business
- snapping up shares in Cityline, opening new websites and
looking for new partners. "The biggest challenge now,"
he says, "is to focus on returns for investors and expand
analyst coverage beyond the three banks that underwrote the
stock. We've got to keep the momentum going. The key is to
get a few good analysts who believe in the business and recommend
it. That, in turn, will get investors interested." For
a seasoned road warrior one thing is certain: you can't slow
down. 
Steven Crane is executive editor of
CFO Asia
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Pitstops and Detours
For Achieva, the road to listing
was all uphill.
Way back in 1997, Angela Lim, group financial
controller at IT and electronic components distributor Achieva,
began discussions with management and advisors on going public.
The first issue was to examine the seven-year-old Singaporean
company's need to list versus its desire. Consultants were
hired to brief management on the process and its consequences,
including greater transparency; relations with investors,
analysts and the public; financial planning; and, of course,
the amount of funds required. For months they thrashed out
the capabilities required, in terms of staff and strategy,
to make the shift from a private to a public company. By mid-year,
the decision was made to go ahead. In addition to needing
more funds, the company wanted the advantages of credibility,
exposure and maturity that public companies enjoy.
At the same time, Lim began getting her
financial house in order - training staff, standardizing reporting
procedures and "cleaning up" the company's shareholding
structure with its joint venture partners and owners spread
out over Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Then the financial
crisis hit and priorities changed to hedging and protecting
earnings. By late 1998, after stabilizing treasury operations
and with hedging practices well in place, the time appeared
right to get back in the IPO driver's seat. "Part of
the strategy," explains Lim, "was to mitigate currency
risk by expanding operations into more stable currency markets
like Vietnam, China and Australia. [Also] we needed cash."
In April 1999, with the year-end audit
finished, Lim concentrated on compliance issues with the Singapore
Exchange - related party transactions, corporate governance
and disclosure standards. By September, the application was
submitted but the rules had changed. Instead the Singapore
Exchange's 12-month audit requirement, which had been six
months actual and six months forecast, was nine months actual
and three months forecast. Lim resubmitted the documents in
November. "With day-to-day operations, the Exchange and
the crisis to deal with," says Lim, "there were
several times when I thought I was going crazy."
By the end of last year, she was expecting
clearance in February. A high number of listing applications,
holidays, Y2K preparations, and another audit caused more
delays from the regulators. She finally got the go-ahead in
March for an April listing. Again, fate intervened, this time
in the form of a worldwide stock market plunge. And this time
Lim postpones the offering. The upside is that the 1999 audit
results, a pretty good year for Achieva with net profits of
S$4.55 million on turnover of S$229.2 million compared to
S$4.09 million and S$190.5 in 1998, can be included. On May
22, Lim goes ahead and the shares debut at S$0.22 with an
offer of 21 million shares to the public and 82.5 million
placed out for a total of S$21.2 million raised. The retail
issue is 6.2 times oversubscribed, but the first day of trading
ends, as it has for many companies recently, lackluster, at
20.5 cents.
In this market, says Singapore-based Curtis
Montgomery, CEO at on-line research analyst WallStraits.com,
good companies with strong track records, healthy fundamentals
and strong management are suffering along with lesser ones.
"There's no rationality. Even in bull markets here, a
terrible company on the verge of bankruptcy can rise above
the market average." As for Lim, she's disappointed with
the stock's reception but accepts it with Confucian reserve.
"We knew the market was still soft but decided to go
ahead hoping we'd get support because we're not a dotcom company.
After all the delays, we decided let's just get going."
That decision, regardless of an under-achieving
share price, says Lim, still has a positive impact. She plans
to use the bulk of the money raised to improve working capital
capacity by reducing short-term bank borrowings as well as
upgrading the company's IT infrastructure. "It would
have been easier to tap money from angel investors and venture
capitalists, but [taking] the long-term [view], going public
was the only solution," she says.
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Side-swiped
Techpacific's listing crashes.
Or does it?
Of all the companies that ignored poor
road conditions, so to speak, and went speeding down the IPO
highway, investment bank and incubator techpacific.com appeared
to have the roughest ride. After cutting back from the indicative
range of HK$1.38 to $1.68, to its issue price of HK$1.05,
the stock sank to 55 cents in the first three minutes of trade
on Hong Kong's Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) before closing
at 29 cents, about 72 percent down from the issue price on
April 12. So what happened? According to Goldman Sachs' Rajeev
Gupta, the timing, especially in terms of world market sentiment
towards incubators, was unfortunate. What's more, comments
by web-based financial analyst David Webb, alleging that pre-IPO
investors got in just weeks before the IPO at one-third the
price and that revenues came mainly from related parties,
spooked the market, says Gupta.
Still, while the 16-month-old company
didn't raise as much as originally planned, it did pocket
HK$315 million (US$40 million) minus 7 to 8 percent in expenses
and fees. For a company with first quarter revenues of US$444,034
on turnover of US$1.54 million, that's big bucks. Further,
the roadshow wasn't targeted at the retail market but at institutional
investors who bought 90 percent of the issue, while the public
was offered a mere 10 percent. In short, the lead manager,
BNP Paribas Peregrine did pretty well, securing core investors
while dodging the danger of a large public offer.
Indeed, techpacific's CFO Joey Borromeo
seems remarkably unruffled, and ticks off the good points
of the issue. First of all, he says, five other companies
applied at about the same time. "We made it in before
the doors shut," he says. "We're now fully cashed
up at a time when capital has become somewhat scarce. Secondly,
by targeting institutional investors, "we've got shareholders
that will hold the stock for two or even three years. And
thirdly, because techpacific is an investor itself in tech
companies, we've benefited from the market correction and
lower valuations. We can now take larger bits of start-ups
for lesser amounts."
From the time the company began operations
in April 1999, explains Borromeo, the intention was to take
it to Nasdaq. "But we had to develop the business first.
Listing on GEM is good training," he points out, "because
of the discipline it provides even though the depth and breadth
of the investor isn't comparable with Nasdaq. Still, we've
established a track record with the listing," he says,
"and investors don't mind a few small speed bumps along
the way - like us, they look at the long-term roadmap."
At least, that's what Borromeo is counting on.
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